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Abstract
This paper studies shrouding of add-on information in a market
where firms differ in add-on production costs. We show that partial
shrouding equilibria, characterised by a selection result, exist: Firms
with high (low) add-on costs shroud (unshroud). Unshrouding firms
charge lower base-good prices than shrouding firms.
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1 Introduction
It has been recognised that in many markets consumer information and
transparency on prices can be heavily influenced by firms’ strategies. In a
recent paper, Gabaix and Laibson (2006), henceforth GL, consider an indus-
trywhere firms sell a base good and add-on, and analyse firms’ incentives to
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shroud add-on information.1 They show that, independent of the intensity
of competition, shrouding equilibria exist where no firm has an incentive to
educate consumers about high add-on prices.
The present paper considers such shrouding decisions in a market where
firms differ in their marginal costs of producing the add-on. We also depart
fromGL in that the number of myopic consumers who become educated by
unshrouding increases with the number of unshrouding firms.
We find similar equilibria as in GL for high and low levels of myopic con-
sumers. For high (low) levels of myopic consumers symmetric shrouding
(unshrouding) equilibria exist where all firms shroud (unshroud) add-on
information. Unilke GL, for intermediate levels of myopic consumers, par-
tial shrouding equilibria exist where only a subset of firms shrouds. A se-
lection result occurs: The subset of unshrouding (shrouding) firms contains
those with the lowest (highest) add-on production cost. The reason behind
this selection result is that a firmwith a large add-on productivity has larger
incentives to unshroud add-on information as it benefits to a larger extent
from an increase in add-on sales by sophisticated consumers due to un-
shrouding.
In a partial shrouding equilibrium, unshrouding firms behave more ag-
gressively than shrouding firms, charging lower base-good prices and ob-
taining a larger market share. This is novel as one would usually suspect
the shrouding firms (who have a high add-on price) to charge low base-
good prices. However, due to our selection result, this is overturned. Even
though unshrouding firms sell the add-on at a lower price, they have a
higher add-on profitability due to lower cost and hence larger incentive to
compete tough on the base-good market.2
The paper contributes to the growing literature on obfuscation choices by
firms. Most of this literature focusses on symmetric firm environments, but
few consider cost asymmetries. Dahremöller (2013) considers asymmetric
1Prominent examples for such markets are retail financial markets, for instance, current
accounts and overdraft fees as an add-on, or credit cards with late fees as the add-on.
2A potential application of the model might be the car market. Typically, a buyer faces
the price of the base version of a car, and after having selected a car, the car dealer often tries
to sell additional packages as add-on. The results of the paper would then suggest that less
efficient carmanufacturers have larger incentives to sell more complex packages or packages
comprising a larger number of less useful features.
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add-on costs in a duopoly market, but assumes a sequential time structure
where shrouding decisions aremade before pricing decisions. He finds that
in such a setting only unshrouding equilibria exist. In contrast, in our paper,
also partial shrouding equilibria exist. It is thus an empirical questionwhich
predictions can be supported by evidence. Heidhues et al. (2014) propose
a model where asymmetric firms sell a single product whose price consists
of two components, but focuses on symmetric shrouding equilibria. Wilson
(2010) shows that also in symmetric environments asymmetric obfuscation
choices can arise to relax price competition among firms.
2 The model
The model is based on Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but differs in two di-
mensions. First, we consider an industry where firms differ with respect
to add-on costs. Second, we consider an alternative unshrouding mecha-
nism where the share of myopic consumers who becomes educated due to
unshrouding depends on the number of unshrouding firms.
Consider an oligopoly market where n ≥ 2 firms offer a base good and an
add-on. Each consumer demands at most one unit of the base good and
one unit of the add-on, which can only be bought from the same firm. All
firms produce the base good at identical costs normalised to zero, but differ
in the add-on production costs.3 The constant marginal costs for producing
the add-on by firm i is ci. Firms are ordered such that c1 < c2 < ... < cn.
All consumers observe base-good prices pi. A firm’s add-on price, pˆi, how-
ever, can only be observed if it is advertised. There are myopic and sophis-
ticated consumers. Sophisticated consumers are aware of the add-on and
form beliefs about add-on prices if they are shrouded. Myopic consumers
are unaware of the add-on and ignore add-on prices. Initially, the share of
myopic (sophisticated) consumers is α (1− α), where α ∈ (0, 1).
Firms can unshroud (advertise) add-on information which has two conse-
quences. First, if a firm unshrouds, sophisticated consumers learn the add-
on price charged by this firm. Second, by unshrouding some myopic con-
3The model can easily be extended to also cover cost asymmetry for the base product,
however, this has no impact on unshrouding incentives.
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sumers are educated and act like sophisticated consumers. As in Wenzel
(2014), it is assumed that the fraction of consumers that become sophisti-
cated depends on the number of unshrouding firms. To be concrete, sup-
pose that for each each unshrouding firm, the number ofmyopic consumers
is reduced by a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, if k firms unshroud, a fraction
α(1− λ)k of consumers remains myopic.4
There is a maximal price of p¯ that firms may charge for the add-on. More-
over, sophisticated consumers can avoid the add-on purchase by using an
outside option at a cost e in stage 2.
To model competition in the base-good market we employ a logit model of
product differentiation (e.g., Anderson and de Palma, 2001). Firms offer dif-
ferentiated base-good products, and the preferences of a myopic consumer
j, only aware of the base good, buying from firm i can be described by
uij = v − pi + ǫij . (1)
The match value ǫij is the realisation of a random variable (iid across firms
and consumers) which is double exponentially distributed with mean zero
and standard deviation µ, where µ can be interpreted as the degree of prod-
uct differentiation. Myopic consumers pick the firm that offers the best com-
bination of base-good price and match value. Then, the expected demand
from myopic consumers of firm i is
Dmi =
exp[(−pi)/µ]∑n
k=1 exp[(−pk)/µ]
. (2)
Sophisticated consumers are aware of the add-on and, when selecting the
base good, take add-on prices into account. Expected demand from sophis-
ticated consumers is
Dsi =
exp[(−pi − E(pˆi))/µ]∑n
k=1 exp[(−pk − E(pˆk))/µ]
. (3)
We study the following three-stage game:
4One reason for this modification is that it is more likely that a myopic consumer picks
up add-on information if more firms unshroud by sending out advertising messages. A
more general setup (however, with symmetric firms) without assuming a functional form is
studied in Wenzel (2014).
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• In stage 1, firms set prices for the base good, pi, and for the add-on, pˆi,
and decide whether to unshroud add-on information.
• In stage 2, consumers decide from which firm to buy the base good.
Sophisticated consumers and educated,myopic consumers decidewhether
to substitute away from the add-on.
• In stage 3, myopic consumers buy the add-on. Sophisticated con-
sumers buy the add-on only if they have not substituted away.
3 Results
This section provides the equilibrium of the game. I focus on equilibria in
pure strategies. We start with a preliminary finding:
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, a shrouding firm chooses pˆ = p¯ and an un-
shrouding firm chooses pˆ = e.
This property also holds in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Add-on prices are
high if shrouded and low if unshrouded. This means that sophisticated
consumers always pay e for the add-on (via substitution or buying at pˆ = e).
This also implies Dsi = D
m
i = Di.
Let us next establish that firms with lower add-on costs have larger un-
shrouding incentives than firms with higher add-on costs. Suppose that
a firm decides to shroud the add-on, in which case it sets pˆ = p¯ and sells the
add-on only to myopic consumers. With α̂ myopic consumers firm i earns
profit of
Πi = Di(pi, p−i)[pi + α̂(p¯− ci)]. (4)
If firm i decides to unshroud, it sets pˆ = e and sells the add-on to both types
of consumers earning
Πi = Di(pi, p−i)[pi + (e− ci)]. (5)
Define αi =
e−ci
p¯−ci
. Comparison of (4) and (5) shows that firm i decides to
unshroud iff α < αi. Note that
∂αi
∂ci
< 0, which implies:
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Lemma 2. Firmswith lower add-on costs have larger incentives to unshroud
add-on information.
The intuition behind this finding is that firms with low cost benefit to a
larger extent from increased add-on demand resulting from unshrouding
due to a higher add-on margin. This lemma will be helpful in establishing
the existence of partial shrouding equilibria.
As in GL there exist symmetric equilibria where all firms shroud / un-
shroud:
Proposition 1. i) Let α¯ = e−c1p¯−ci . Then, a shrouding equilibrium exists if
α > α¯. All firms shroud and set pˆ = p¯.
ii) Letα = e−cn
(p¯−cn)(1−λ)n−1
. Then, an unshrouding equilibrium exists ifα < α.
All firms unshroud and set pˆ = e.
This mirrors the structure in GL. Part i) shows that if the number of my-
opic consumers is sufficiently large no firm unshrouds in equilibrium. Part
ii) demonstrates that for a low number of myopic consumers all firms un-
shroud.
Unilke GL, with asymmetric add-on productivity also partial shrouding
equilibria exist:
Proposition 2. Suppose λ < 1 −
(e−ck+1)/(p¯−ck+1)
(e−ck)/(p¯−ck)
. Then, there exists an
α such that e−ck
(p¯−ck)(1−λ)k−1
> α >
e−ck+1
(p¯−ck+1)(1−λ)k
, and a partial shrouding
equilibrium exists. Low-cost firms (Firms 1,...,k) unshroud and high-cost
firms (Firms k+1,...,n) shroud. Unshrouding firms set pˆ = e and shrouding
firms set pˆ = p¯.
Prices of the base good and profits of an unshrouding / shrouding firm are
implicitly given by:
p∗u + (e− cu) =
µ
1−Du(p∗u, p
∗
−u)
; Π∗u = p
∗
u + (e− cu)− µ (6)
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p∗s+α(1−µ)
k(p¯−cs) =
µ
1−Ds(p∗s, p
∗
−s)
; Π∗s = p
∗
s+α(1−µ)
k(p¯−cs)−µ
(7)
Proposition 2 provides conditions for the existence of partial shrouding
equilibria where only a subset of firms shrouds. The proposition delivers
a selection result: Firms with low add-on production cost unshroud while
firms with high add-on production cost shroud.
There are two points worth emphasising. Firstly, partial shrouding equilib-
ria arise only for intermediate levels of myopic consumers e−ck
(p¯−ck)(1−λ)k−1
>
α >
e−ck+1
(p¯−ck+1)(1−λ)k
. For higher (lower) levels of myopic consumers, themore
(less) efficient firms would have an incentive to shroud (unshroud). Sec-
ondly, the existence of partial shrouding equilibria depend on the degree
of cost asymmetry. With identical firms partial shrouding equilibria do not
exist as the condition λ < 1−
(e−ck+1)/(p¯−ck+1)
(e−ck)/(p¯−ck)
is not satisfied for ck+1 = ck.
Indeed, partial shrouding equilibria aremore likely to arise if the cost asym-
metry is rather large.
Finally, let us explore the differences between shrouding and unshrouding
firms regarding base-good prices and market shares in a partial shrouding
equilibrium:
Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a partial shrouding equilibrium. Then,
any unshrouding firms has a lower base-good price and a larger market
share than any shrouding firm. Moreover, any unshrouding firm has a
higher average markup per consumer than any shrouding firm.
In a partial shrouding equilibrium unshrouding firms behave more aggres-
sively by charging lower base-goodprices andobtaining highermarket shares.
This result is somewhat unexpected, as one would usually suspect shroud-
ing firms, that charge high add-on prices, to set lower base-good prices.
Here, however, this intuition is overturned due to our selection result. Un-
shrouding firms, though charging a low add-on price, have nevertheless
higher add-on profits due to lower cost. This makes unshrouding firms
compete more aggressively for more market share.
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A Appendix
Derivations of Lemma 1
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which firm i shrouds. Then, the add-on
price is not observable and as demand of the add-on is inelastic, then firm has for
any given price expectation an incentive to increase the price to the upper limit p¯.
Hence, any price below p¯ is not credible. Sophisticated consumers expect p¯ and
avoid add-on consumption. Hence, pˆ = p¯ if the firm shrouds in equilibrium.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which firm i unshrouds. Then, all con-
sumers observe the add-on price. A price below e is not profit-maximising as price
could be increased up to e without losing demand. Charging any price above e
cannot be part of an unshrouding equilibrium. As with price above e a firmwould
only sell to myopic consumers in which case it it would be optimal to shroud as to
maximize the number of myopic consumers. Hence, pˆ = e if the firm unshrouds
in equilibrium.
Derivations of Proposition 1
The proof followsGL. i) Suppose that α > e−c1
p¯−c1
. By Lemma 2we only have to check
whether Firm 1 has an incentive to deviate from shrouding.
Suppose that all firms except Firm 1 shroud the add-on. If Firm 1 shrouds it opti-
mally sets pˆ = p¯ earningΠs1 = αD
m
1 [p1+(p¯−c1)]+(1−α)D
s
1[p1] = D1[p1+α(p¯−c1)].
If Firm 1 unshrouds it optimally sets pˆ = e earning Πu1 = αD
m
1 [p1+(e− c1)] + (1−
α)Ds1[p1 + (e − c1)] = D1[p1 + (e − c1)]. The comparison reveals that shrouding
leads to higher profits if α > e−c1
p¯−c1
.
ii) Suppose that α < e−cn(p¯−cn)(1−λ)n−1 . By Lemma 2 we only have to check whether
Firm n has an incentive to deviate from unshrouding.
Suppose that all firms except Firm n shroud the add-on. If Firm n shrouds it opti-
mally sets pˆ = p¯ earning Πsn = Dn[pn + α(1− λ)
n−1(p¯− cn)]. If Firm n unshrouds
it optimally sets pˆ = e earning Πun = Dn[pn + (e − cn)]. Comparison reveals that
unshrouding leads to higher profits if α < e−cn(p¯−cn)(1−λ)n−1 .
Derivations of Proposition 2
Supposeλ < 1−
e−ck+1
p¯−ck+1
e−ck
p¯−ck
. This implies that there exists anα such that e−ck
(p¯−ck)(1−λ)k−1
>
α > e−ck+1
(p¯−ck+1)(1−λ)k
. We show that a partial shrouding equilibrium exists such that
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low-cost firms (Firms 1,...,k) unshroud andhigh-cost firms (Firms k+1,...,n) shroud.
By Lemma 2 it suffices to show that Firm k (k+1) has no incentive to deviate from
unshrouding (shrouding). Firm k prefers to unshroud if α < (e− ck)/(p¯− ck)(1−
λ)k−1 and firm k+1prefers to shroud ifα > (e−ck+1)/(p¯−ck+1)(1−λ)
k. Hence, for
e−ck
(p¯−ck)(1−λ)k−1
> α > e−ck+1
(p¯−ck+1)(1−λ)k
there exists a partial shrouding equilibrium.
Base-good prices and firm profits can be derived from the FOC.
We note that no partial shrouding equilibrium without the selection property ex-
ists. This is shown by contradiction. Suppose there exists an equilibrium where
firm k shrouds and firm h unshrouds where and ck < ch. The total number of un-
shrouding firms is g. For firm k shrouding is optimal if α > (e−ck)/(p¯−ck)(1−λ)
g
and for firm k+h unshrouding is optimal if α < (e−ch)/(p¯−ch)(1−λ)
g−1. Hence,
such an equilibrium can only exist if there is an α such that both conditions exist.
However, (e− ch)/(p¯− ch)(1− λ)
g−1 > (e− ck)/(p¯− ck)(1− λ)
g ⇔ ck > ch which
is a contradiction and, hence, no such equilibrium exists.
Derivations of Proposition 3
Let bi be the per-consumer add-on revenues: bu = α(e − cu) for an unshrouding
firm; bs = α(p¯ − cs) for a shrouding firm. Note that due to selection result in
equilibrium, bu > bs. Logit demand implies Du > Ds ⇔ pu < ps. From the
FOC we have Du > Ds ⇔ ps + bs > pu + bu. Taken together, it follows that
Du > Ds ⇔ bu > bs. Hence, any unshrouding firm has a lower base-good price
and a higher market share than any shrouding firm.
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